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
Finite-size DIQKD with noisy preprocessing and random key measurements

Ernest Y.-Z. Tan, Pavel Sekatski, Jean-Daniel Bancal, Xavier Valcarce, René Schwonnek, Renato Renner, Nicolas Sangouard, Charles C.-W. Lim

[SBV+20] [arXiv:2009.01784](https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.01784)

[TSB+20] [arXiv:2012.08714](https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.08714)

Device-independent scenario



Bell violation \Rightarrow is entangled

Regardless of measurements or system dimension!

Prospects for DIQKD

Benefits:

- New level of security
- Improved resistance to hacking

Recent proposals
for improvement



Challenges:

- Security analysis is difficult
- Low noise tolerance

Protocol variant: Noisy preprocessing

Key-generating measurements

One-way keyrate:



Alice adds (trusted) noise

[HST+20] [arXiv:2005.13015](https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.13015)

Protocol variant: Random key measurements

Key-generating measurements

One-way keyrate:

[SGP+20] [arXiv:2005.02691](https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.02691)

Previous results: key features

- Based on CHSH inequality Go beyond CHSH?
- DIQKD possible asymptotically Finite-size analysis?
 - Noisy preprocessing: Photons Combine variants?
 - Random key measurements: NV centres, cold atoms
- (Recent important developments, will return later)

Our contributions

- “Device-independent quantum key distribution from generalized CHSH inequalities”, [SBV+20] [arXiv:2009.01784](https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.01784)
 - Beyond CHSH (+ noisy preprocessing)
 - Preceded by [WAP20] [arXiv:2007.16146](https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.16146)

- “Improved DIQKD protocols with finite-size analysis”, [TSB+20] [arXiv:2012.08714](https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.08714)
 - Combines protocol variants
 - Algorithm to compute keyrates (→ new noise tolerance thresholds)
 - Finite-size analysis

Overview

- Part 1: Asymptotic keyrates
 - [\[SBV+20\]](#) Beyond CHSH (+ noisy preprocessing)
 - [\[TSB+20\]](#) Combining all variants
 - New depolarizing-noise threshold
- Part 2: Finite-size analysis
 - Several technical improvements
 - Consider existing Bell tests
- Outlook and recent developments

Part 1: Asymptotic keyrates

- Typically in (DI)QKD protocol:
 - Perform parameter estimation
 - Abort if observed values outside “acceptable” range
- Main security proof requirement: *Asymptotic keyrate*

Lower-bound minimum

over “acceptable” states and measurements

Focus on 2-input 2-output: use “qubit reduction”

Tilted CHSH inequalities

[SBV+20]

- Security based on value of



CHSH:

- Alternative view: using two statistics

- : Closed-form keyrate expression


- : Numerical approach

- New(?) continuity bound!

More efficient approach in
[WAP20] [arXiv:2007.16146](https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.16146)

Results: SPDC (photon) model

- Tilted CHSH improves keyrate
- But threshold remains similar
 - (About 82.6%)



Combining variants [\[TSB+20\]](#)

- Noisy preprocessing + random key measurements + all statistics
- Numerical, but *reliable*
 - Also: converges to tight bound

min

- Minimization over states
 - Follow [WLC17] [arXiv:1710.05511](#)
- Minimization over measurements
 - Use continuity bound + other tricks

over states and measurements

Results: depolarizing noise

Protocol	Noise threshold
[PAB+09] “Basic” protocol	7.14%
[HST+20] Noisy preprocessing	8.08%
[WAP20] Noisy preprocessing + tilted CHSH	8.34%
[SGP+20] Random key measurements	8.39%
[TSB+20] Combining variants	9.33%
Simple upper bound for this family	9.57%

Results: existing Bell experiments


- Asymptotic keyrates > 0 (as expected)
- NV centres, cold atoms:
 - Mainly via random key measurements (+ a bit of noisy preprocessing)
- Photons (SPDC)
 - Optimizing experiment is challenging
 - Did not find improvements beyond [\[SBV+20\]](#) (noisy preprocessing)

Part 2: Finite-size analysis


[TSB+20]

- Using entropy accumulation theorem
 - Incorporates finite-size and non-IID effects
 - Previously applied to “basic” protocol [AFRV16] [arXiv:1607.01797](https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.01797)
- Our technical contributions:
 - Combining protocol variants
 - Proof modifications (tighter bounds, practical error correction)
 - Pre-shared key proposal (2x keyrate for random key measurements)

Finite-size bounds




NV-centre Bell test [\[HBD+15\]](#)




Cold-atom Bell test [\[RBG+17\]](#)

Finite-size bounds (optimized for IID)



Cold-atom Bell test [\[RBG+17\]](#)

Recap: SPDC model (asymptotic)



Subsequent developments

- Better methods to compute asymptotic keyrates
 - [BFF21] [arxiv:2106.13692](https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.13692) and [MPW21] [arxiv:2107.08894](https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.08894)
- Simplified photonic model:
 - Threshold efficiency 80.26%
 - Substantially higher keyrates
- No finite-size analysis yet

Summary and outlook

- Our contributions
 - Method for tilted CHSH (see independent work [\[WAP20\]](#))
 - Method for combining all variants
 - New depolarizing-noise threshold
 - Various improvements to finite-size analysis
- Going forward
 - NV centres / cold atoms need significant improvement
 - Photonic implementations promising; need detailed analysis
 - Upper bounds: [\[KWW18\]](#) [\[WDH19\]](#) [\[AL20\]](#) [\[CFH20\]](#) [\[FBJL+21\]](#) [\[KHD21\]](#)

Thank you!