

On the Compressed-Oracle Technique, and Post-Quantum Security of Proofs of Sequential Work

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
Overview

- ▶ (Quantum) Random Oracle Model
- ▶ Summary of Our Results
- ▶ Lazy Sampling Technique - Classical and Quantum
- ▶ Our Results in More Detail

Random Oracle Model:


A way to analyze classical cryptographic schemes that use a hash function

hash functions $\stackrel{\text{idealized}}{\approx}$ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{uniform sampled function,} \\ \text{everyone has access} \end{array} \right.$




Quantum Random Oracle Model

hash functions $\overset{\text{idealized}}{\approx}$ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{uniform sampled function,} \\ \text{everyone has quantum access} \end{array} \right.$



(Q)ROM with Parallel Queries



A Typical Example Problem

0-preimage problem: finding x s.t. $H(x) = 0$,

- ▶ well-studied and understood classically and quantumly,
- ▶ e.g. running Grover's search in parallel is known to be optimal for parallel queries.

Another Example Problem

Hash-chain problem: finding x_0, x_1, \dots, x_q s.t. $x_{i+1} = H(x_i)$:

$$x_0 \xrightarrow{H} x_1 \xrightarrow{H} x_2 \xrightarrow{H} \dots \xrightarrow{H} x_q$$

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- ▶ easy with q sequential queries, but
- ▶ expected to be hard with $< q$ sequential queries,
- ▶ even if we can query k data points in parallel each round.

$$x_0 \xrightarrow{H} x_1 \xrightarrow{H} x_2 \xrightarrow{H} \cdots \xrightarrow{H} x_q$$

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Easy to show classically (i.e. without quantum access).

- ▶ No quantum proof prior to our work.

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Our Work

A framework for analyzing such problems in parallel QROM:

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- ▶ Applied to various examples:
 - ▶ simplify existing proofs, e.g. 0-preimage,
 - ▶ obtain new bounds, e.g. collision, q-chain,
 - ▶ main application: first post-quantum security of proof of sequential work scheme by [Cohen and Pietrzak, 2018].

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Independent and concurrent work: [Blocki et al., 2021].

Lazy Sampling

$$A^H \approx A^D$$

x	H(x)
00	y_0
01	y_1
10	y_2
11	y_3

x	$D_2(x) = D_1^{011}$
00	\perp
01	y_1
10	\perp
11	y_3

x	$D_0(x) = \perp$
00	\perp
01	\perp
10	\perp
11	\perp

01 queried

x	$D_1(x) = D_0^{001}$
00	\perp
01	y_1
10	\perp
11	\perp

11 queried

Lazy Sampling, Formally

Simulate RO H with a database D :

- ▶ formalized as a partial function $D : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y} \cup \{\perp\}$,
- ▶ initially $D_0(x) = \perp$ everywhere,
- ▶ each query $x \in \mathcal{X}$, if $D_i(x) = \perp$, update D_{i+1} at x to a random $y \in \mathcal{Y}$,
- ▶ after q queries, $D_q(x) \neq \perp$ for $\leq q$ values of x .

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Important (example) observation:

if there's no $x \in \mathcal{X}$ s.t. $D_q(x) = 0$, then

- ▶ the adversary \mathcal{A} is unlikely to output x s.t. $H(x) = 0$,
- ▶ best guess: some x s.t. $D_q(x) = \perp$,
- ▶ success probability $\leq 1/\#\mathcal{Y}$.

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$$\Pr \left[\mathcal{A}^H \rightarrow x \text{ s.t. } H(x) = 0 \right] \leq \Pr [\exists x \in \mathcal{X} \text{ s.t. } D_q(x) = 0] + 1/\#\mathcal{Y}$$

Quantum Lazy Sampling

(A way to understand Zhandry's "compressed oracle" [Zhandry, 2019])

$$\sum_{y_0, y_1, y_2, y_3 \in \mathcal{Y}} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{Y}|^2} \left| \begin{array}{c} \times \\ 00 \\ 01 \\ 10 \\ 11 \end{array} \right. \left. \begin{array}{c} H(x) \\ y_0 \\ y_1 \\ y_2 \\ y_3 \end{array} \right\rangle \quad \sum_{y_1, y_2 \in \mathcal{Y}} \alpha_{y_1} \beta_{y_2} \left| \begin{array}{c} \times \\ 00 \\ 01 \\ 10 \\ 11 \end{array} \right. \left. \begin{array}{c} D_2 \\ \perp \\ y_1 \\ \perp \\ y_3 \end{array} \right\rangle$$

} 11 queried

$$\left| \begin{array}{c} \times \\ 00 \\ 01 \\ 10 \\ 11 \end{array} \right. \left. \begin{array}{c} D_0(x) = \perp \\ \perp \\ \perp \\ \perp \\ \perp \end{array} \right\rangle \xrightarrow{01 \text{ queried}} \sum_{y_1 \in \mathcal{Y}} \alpha_{y_1} \left| \begin{array}{c} \times \\ 00 \\ 01 \\ 10 \\ 11 \end{array} \right. \left. \begin{array}{c} D_1 \\ \perp \\ y_1 \\ \perp \\ \perp \end{array} \right\rangle$$

Quantum Lazy Sampling

Similarly, QRO can be simulated quantumly s.t.¹

- ▶ the state of database is a **superposition** $\sum \alpha_D |D\rangle$ of partial functions $D : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y} \cup \{\perp\}$ with $\leq q$ non- \perp entries after q queries.

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Similar (example) property:

if there's no x s.t. $D_q(x) = 0$, where D_q now is obtained by **measuring** the database state, then

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- ▶ the adversary \mathcal{A} is unlikely to output x s.t. $H(x) = 0$,
- ▶ except with a small error bounded as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} & \sqrt{\Pr[\mathcal{A}^H \rightarrow x \text{ s.t. } H(x) = 0]} \\ & \leq \sqrt{\Pr[\exists x \in \mathcal{X} \text{ s.t. } D_q(x) = 0]} + \sqrt{1/\#\mathcal{Y}} \end{aligned}$$

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Toy Example, and Its classical Analysis (for now)

How to bound $\Pr[D_q \in \text{PRMG}]$, where $\text{PRMG} := \{D \mid \exists x \text{ s.t. } D(x) = 0\}$?



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1. $\Pr[D_q \in \text{PRMG}] \leq \sum_i \Pr[D_i \in \text{PRMG} \mid D_{i-1} \notin \text{PRMG}]$

$$\leq q \left[\neg \text{PRMG} \xrightarrow{k} \text{PRMG} \right] \text{ ("transition capacity")}$$



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2. Observe

$$D_{i-1} \notin \text{PRMG} \text{ and } D_i \in \text{PRMG}$$

\Downarrow

$$\exists j : D_i(x_j) = 0 \neq D_{i-1}(x_j).$$

Thus, $[\neg\text{PRMG} \xrightarrow{k} \text{PRMG}] \leq k/\#\mathcal{Y}$,



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$$\text{All together: } \Pr[D_q \in \text{PRMG}] \leq q \cdot k / \#\mathcal{Y}.$$



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²Terminology: "transition is (strongly) **recognizable by local properties** $\mathcal{L}_j = \{0\}$."

High-level Recipe of The Proof

1. Decompose into sum of **transition capacities**:

$$\Pr[D_q \in P] \leq \sum_i [\neg P_{i-1} \xrightarrow{k} P_i] (= q \cdot [\neg P \xrightarrow{k} P] \text{ for } P_i = P).$$

2. Bound the transition capacities by **local properties**

$$[\neg P_{i-1} \xrightarrow{k} P_i] \leq \sum_j \Pr[\text{UNIF} \in \mathcal{L}_j],$$

that **recognize** the transition.

Our framework:

same recipe, different definition of transition capacity $[\cdot \rightarrow \cdot]$, adjusted formulas:

1. $\sqrt{\Pr[D_q \in P]} \leq \sum [\neg P_{i-1} \xrightarrow{k} P_i]$,
2. $[\neg P_{i-1} \xrightarrow{k} P_i] \leq \sqrt{10 \sum_j \Pr[\text{UNIF} \in \mathcal{L}_j]}$ (same classical probabilities)

(or $\leq e \sum_j \sqrt{10 \Pr[\text{UNIF} \in \mathcal{L}_j]}$ in case of weak recognizability)

The 0-Preimage Example - Now Quantum

From classical analysis:

local properties $\mathcal{L}_j = \{0\}$ with $\Pr[\text{UNIF} \in \mathcal{L}_j] = \frac{1}{\#\mathcal{Y}}$.

Our framework, Eq. 2:

$$\llbracket \neg \text{PRMG} \xrightarrow{k} \text{PRMG} \rrbracket \leq \sqrt{10 \sum_j \Pr[\text{UNIF} \in \mathcal{L}_j]} \leq \sqrt{\frac{10k}{\#\mathcal{Y}}}.$$

Our framework, Eq. 1:

$$\sqrt{\Pr[D_q \in \text{PRMG}]} \leq q \cdot \llbracket \neg \text{PRMG} \xrightarrow{k} \text{PRMG} \rrbracket \leq q \sqrt{\frac{10k}{\#\mathcal{Y}}}.$$

All together (reconfirming optimality of parallel Grover).

$$\Pr[D_q \in \text{PRMG}] \leq \frac{10q^2k}{\#\mathcal{Y}}.$$

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$$\Pr[D_q \in \text{PRMG}] \leq \frac{10q^2k}{\#\mathcal{Y}}.$$

No need to understand definition of $\llbracket \cdot \rightarrow \cdot \rrbracket$. We can simply “lift” classical proof.

Additional Results

By the same recipe, we obtain several additional (new) results:

$Q=kq$	coarse-grained	fine-grained	algorithms
0-preimage	$O\left(\frac{Q^2}{\#\mathcal{Y}}\right)$	$O\left(\frac{kq^2}{\#\mathcal{Y}}\right)$	$\Omega\left(\frac{kq^2}{\#\mathcal{Y}}\right)$
collision	$O\left(\frac{Q^3}{\#\mathcal{Y}}\right)$	$O\left(\frac{k^2q^3}{\#\mathcal{Y}}\right)$	$\Omega\left(\frac{k^2q^3}{\#\mathcal{Y}}\right)$
q-chain	not applicable	$O\left(\frac{k^3q^3}{\#\mathcal{Y}}\right)$?

³the red color bounds are our new results

A More Complex Application: PoSW

We proved the **post-quantum** security of non-interactive PoSW constructed by [Cohen and Pietrzak, 2018].

$$\text{Adv} \leq O \left(k^2 q^2 \left(\frac{q+2}{2^{n+1}} \right)^t + \frac{k^3 q^3 n}{\#\mathcal{Y}} + \frac{tn}{\#\mathcal{Y}} \right)$$

- ▶ q query rounds with k query points per round,
- ▶ n, t security parameters.

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- ▶ n, t security parameters.

Technical challenge:

- ▶ PoSW scheme **intertwines several problems** (collision, q -chain, and more)
- ▶ Need tools to **decompose** complicated transition capacities.

Calculus for Capacities

We give basic rules to manipulate quantum transition capacities:

- ▶ $\llbracket P \xrightarrow{k} Q \rrbracket = \llbracket Q \xrightarrow{k} P \rrbracket$,
- ▶ $\max\{\llbracket Q \xrightarrow{k} P \rrbracket, \llbracket Q \xrightarrow{k} P' \rrbracket\} \leq \llbracket Q \xrightarrow{k} P \cup P' \rrbracket \leq \llbracket Q \xrightarrow{k} P \rrbracket + \llbracket Q \xrightarrow{k} P' \rrbracket$,
- ▶ $\llbracket P \cap Q \xrightarrow{k} P' \rrbracket \leq \min\{\llbracket P \xrightarrow{k} P' \rrbracket, \llbracket Q \xrightarrow{k} P' \rrbracket\}$.

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But also more involved ones, e.g.

$$\llbracket \neg P_0 \xrightarrow{k} P_n \rrbracket \leq \sum_i \left(\llbracket \neg P_0 \xrightarrow{\bar{k}_i} \neg Q \rrbracket + \llbracket Q \setminus P_{i-1} \xrightarrow{k_i} Q \cap P_i \rrbracket \right)$$

where $k = k_1 + \dots + k_n$ and $\bar{k}_i = k_1 + \dots + k_i$.

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where $k = k_1 + \dots + k_n$ and $\bar{k}_i = k_1 + \dots + k_i$.

Allow to work with $\llbracket \cdot \rightarrow \cdot \rrbracket$ on an abstract level, without understanding the definition.

Recap

By means of

- ▶ abstracting away technical aspects of Zhandry's compressed oracle technique, and
- ▶ proving new technical results for parallel queries.

We offer a framework that, when applicable,

- ▶ proves query-complexity bounds in the parallel-query QROM,
- ▶ using **purely classical** means, by “lifting” corresponding classical proofs.

Applied to different example problems:

recover known results, find new results.

That's It

Thanks for your listening!

Arxiv. 2010.11658

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