


Motivation



Solution: Tokenized MAC

- $Keygen \rightarrow sk$ (secret),
- $Tokengen(sk) \rightarrow |tok\rangle$ (Signing tokens)
- $Sign_{|tok\rangle}(m) \rightarrow \sigma$ (Signature)
- $Verify_{sk}(m, \sigma) \rightarrow \text{Yes/No}$.
- **Correctness:** Signing a document using a valid token passes verification.
- **Security:** Given oracle access to verification, one cannot sign $\ell + 1$ distinct documents using ℓ tokens.
- **Previous Constructions:** [1]

Impracticality of previous work[1]

- Used highly entangled states as the tokens that are hard to prepare.
- Required perfect quantum devices.

Our Goal: To construct an alternate scheme which is practically feasible.

Our Contributions


- The first Tokenized MAC scheme that uses **Conjugate Coding states for the signing token**.
 - The first tokenized MAC scheme to be **noise tolerant upto 14% error**.
- Assumptions:** Post-quantum collision-resistant hash functions exist.

Mini Scheme for 1-bit

- $Keygen(1^\lambda)$ – creates a key $(a, b) \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \times \{0,1\}^\lambda$.
- $Tokengen_{(a,b)}$ – creates the token $|t\rangle = H^b|a\rangle$.
- $Sign_{|t\rangle}(m)$ – Measures the qubits of $(H^m)^{\otimes \lambda} |t\rangle$ in the computational basis, to get a signature σ .
- $Verify_{(a,b)}(m, \sigma)$ – checks if the signature σ is consistent with $(H^m)^{\otimes \lambda} (H^b|a\rangle)$ on the computational basis.

Achieves Unconditional mini scheme Security

A typical Signing token



Noise Tolerant Variant

- Noise Model: **IID Errors**
- Achieved by making the verification lenient: accept a signature **even if consistency check fails at most η fraction of the qubits**.
- We show that for $\eta < 0.07$, the scheme is secure, and is tolerant to IID errors occurring with probability 2η on each qubit.

A Noise Preserving Lift

- Standard techniques used in quantum money schemes can lift the mini-scheme to a full blown tokenized MAC scheme.
- The lift preserves noise tolerance.
- The lift assumes only post quantum collision resistant hash functions

Security Proof Idea

- Obstacle: Dealing with the verification oracle- **repeated successful queries on the same message**.
- Solution: Strengthen the adversary by providing extra data on a successful query. Now she **does not need to repeatedly query on a document previously accepted**.
- Reduce such an adversary to an adversary in one of two games both of which has negligible winning probability (proven by semidefinite programming).

Application

- TMACs imply **Quantum One-time memory in the presence of stateless Hardware oracle**.
- Implies **Private Quantum Money**.
- Our scheme **may be practically implementable** in the recent future since it is **noise-tolerant** and requires only **Conjugate coding states that are easy to prepare and transfer over long distances**.

Open Question

- Classical MACs imply one-way functions. Do TMACs imply **Quantum-secure One-way functions**?
- What are its relations between related cryptographic primitives such as **Quantum Encryption with Certified Deletion, Copy-protection** etc? Do they imply each other?

Reference:

[1]Ben-David and O. Sattath. Quantum Tokens for Digital Signatures, 2016, arXiv:1609.09047.

Read the Full Paper at: <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2105.05016.pdf>